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<div class=Section1>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='font-size:16.0pt;line-height:
200%;font-family:Verdana'>Setting the Agenda<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='font-size:16.0pt;line-height:
200%;font-family:Verdana'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='font-size:16.0pt;line-height:
200%;font-family:Verdana'>By Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='font-size:16.0pt;line-height:
200%;font-family:"Palatino Linotype"'>Online Data Appendix <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><b
style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><span style='font-size:16.0pt;line-height:
200%;font-family:"Palatino Linotype"'>Chapter 2: The Procedural Cartel Model
and Its Assumptions<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>

<p class=MsoHeader align=center style='text-align:center;tab-stops:.5in'><i><span
style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></i></p>

<p class=MsoHeader align=center style='text-align:center;tab-stops:.5in'><i><span
style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt'>4. The payoffs of majority
status: super-proportional shares <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>

<p class=MsoHeader align=center style='text-align:center;tab-stops:.5in'><span
class=GramE><i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt'>of</span></i></span><i><span
style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt'> legislative resources<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><span
class=GramE>Section 4.2.</span> A census of legislative resources</p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>��the majority party also
consistently gives itself additional seats on conference committees. Indeed, it
handles conference committees very similarly to the way it handles control
committees: it gives itself a particularly large seat bonus (averaging 3.1% in
the 95<sup>th</sup> to 101<sup>st</sup> Congresses) and routinely ensures that
it gets at least 60% of conference positions.<sup>16�</sup></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span class=GramE>Fn</span> 16.
�The Democrats� smallest majority in the Congresses we examined (95<sup>th</sup>-101<sup>st</sup>)
occurred in the 97<sup>th</sup>, where they held 55.8% of the seats in the
House. During this same Congress, the average Democratic seat share on
conference committees was 60.9%, for an average seat bonus of 5.1%. This was
the smallest average share of conference seats the Democrats took in the period
examined.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span><span class=GramE>(Our sources
for conference committee composition are <span class=SpellE>Hennig</span> 1997
and Bader 2002.).�</span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><span class=GramE><b>Using the STATA dataset <span
style='color:red'>conf votes 95-101.dta</span> (<span style='color:red'>Codebook
for Conf <span class=SpellE>Comms</span> 95-101 data.doc</span>), run the STATA
do-file, <span style='color:red'>section 4-2.do.</span></b></span><b><span
style='color:red'><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span></span>This will produce
the log file <span style='color:red'>section 4-2.log</span>, which holds our
results.<o:p></o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b>From Text: </b><i>�Personal
staff is awarded equally to all members. The lion�s share of committee staff,
however, is awarded to the majority party. For example, the minority party
received only 11.3, 16.9, 16.7, and 16.5 percent of all committee staff
positions in 1965, 1972, 1976, and 1977 respectively (Fox and Hammond 1977, p.
171, table 3)� p. 49</i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><b>To view the table from Fox and Hammond 1977, see <span
style='color:red'>Fox and </span></b><st1:City><st1:place><b><span
  style='color:red'>Hammond</span></b></st1:place></st1:City><b><span
style='color:red'> Table 3.pdf</span>.<o:p></o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><span
class=GramE>Section 4.4.</span> Campaign money</p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><b>From Text</b>:<i> �For example,
Cox and <span class=SpellE>Magar</span> (1999), taking advantage of the natural
experiment produced by the change of party control in the House in 1994, show
that majority status is worth about $36,000 per incumbent member per electoral
cycle (in 1994 dollars). <o:p></o:p></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><b>To view the Cox and <span class=SpellE>Magar</span> 1999
article, see <span style='color:red'>Cox and <span class=SpellE>Magar</span>
(1999).pdf</span>. <o:p></o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><i><span
style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;line-height:200%'>6. How does
the majority cartelize the agenda?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'>6.5
What about quitting the party?</p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'>From text: �<i>if one regresses the
number of terms remaining in a legislator�s career in Congress t on his or her
seniority (i.e., the number of terms already served through Congress t) and a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the member switched parties in Congress t, one
finds the switched party dummy variable to have a statistically significant
coefficient of roughly -3. In other words, by one crude estimate, the cost of
switching parties is three fewer terms in the House than would otherwise be
expected, given a member�s current seniority. <span class=MsoFootnoteReference>32</span>�<o:p></o:p></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><b>Using the do file <span class=SpellE><span
style='color:red'>PartySwitchers.do</span></span> on the dataset <span
class=SpellE><span style='color:red'>PartySwitchers.dta</span></span> produces
the above results, which are presented in log file <span class=SpellE><span
style='color:red'>PartySwitchers.log</span></span>.<span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span>The codebook for <span class=SpellE><span
style='color:red'>PartySwitchers.dta</span></span> is <span class=SpellE><span
style='color:red'>PartySwitchers</span></span><span style='color:red'>
Codebook.doc</span><o:p></o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'><i><span
style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;line-height:200%'>7.
Criticisms of procedural cartel theory<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:200%'>7.2
Pathways around the majority party?</p>

<p class=MsoNormal><span style='background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-left:.5in'><span class=GramE>Fn</span>
39.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span><i>As Cox, Den <span class=SpellE>Hartog</span>,
and McCubbins (2004) demonstrate, there is substantial evidence that cuts
against Krehbiel and <span class=SpellE>Meirowitz�s</span> conclusions.<span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span>Indeed, they find that:<span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span>1) only 27 percent of final passage votes in
Rohde�s dataset are preceded by any motion to recommit, 2) only 13 percent of
all recommital motions are actually passed, and 3) of the 848 total recommital
motions, a majority of the minority party opposes nearly 1 out of 5 recommital
motions.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>� </span>Nothing in Krehbiel and <span
class=SpellE>Meirowitz�s</span> model can account for these results.<o:p></o:p></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><i><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></i></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><b>To view the Cox, Den <span class=SpellE>Hartog</span> and
McCubbins (2004) article, see <span style='color:red'>Cox, Den <span
class=SpellE>Hartog</span> and McCubbins (2004).pdf</span>. <o:p></o:p></b></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

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